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REVIEW ESSAY
THE TRIVIALIZATION OF RELIGION
LESLIE GRIFFIN*
STEPHEN L. CARTER, THE CULTURE OF DISBELIEF: How AMERICAN
LAW AND POLITICS TRIVIALIZE RELIGIOUS DEVOTION (1993).
The subtitle of Stephen Carter's The Culture of Disbelief accurately
captures the essence of the work: "How American Law and Politics
Trivialize Religious Devotion" encapsulates Carter's thesis of the
trivialization of religion in American public life. According to Carter, the
trivialization of religion is manifest in our society; the early chapters of
the book are devoted to the identification of instances of trivialization.
Carter argues that such trivialization is harmful, both to religious
believers and to society as a whole, and in later chapters of the book
suggests ways in which trivialization can be combatted.
The theme of trivialization is paramount, for the identification of the
problem drives its proposed solution. Carter's general thesis, that
religion is trivialized in American public life, is an important one.
However, Carter at times misstates or overstates the problem of
trivialization, which in turn weakens his proposed solutions. In both
areas, the description of the problem and the choice of solution, Carter's
analysis itself runs the risk of trivializing religion.
Carter combines many issues under the label of trivialization. For the
sake of clarity, I will describe four types of trivialization that predominate
in Carter's analysis. The first type of trivialization is our society's refusal
to take religious discourse seriously. Carter's argument focuses on the
anti-religious nature of our public rhetoric: "[Olne sees a trend in our
political and legal cultures toward treating religious beliefs as arbitrary
and unimportant, a trend supported by a rhetoric that implies that there
* Ph. D., Yale University (Religious Studies); J.D., Stanford University.
Assistant Professor, School of Law, Santa Clara University. I wrote this essay as a
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is something wrong with religious devotion."' This rhetoric dismisses
religious beliefs as "fads" and discourages "serious" religious belief.2
The analysis of rhetoric is central to the book as Carter strives to convey
"the attitude that we as a political society hold toward religion." 3
Carter's evidence supporting this anti-religious rhetoric is largely
anecdotal. Certain anecdotes arise from social interactions. For example,
Carter asserts that if a professional were to tell a group of well-educated
professionals that she is committed to a political opinion because it is the
will of God, the conversation would stop. This silence would occur
because many Americans are uncomfortable with the open expression of
religious belief in a professional setting. Other anecdotes display the
contempt shown in the media toward advocates of religious belief,
especially toward members of the Religious Right. Some anecdotes point
to the ways in which the institutions of our society belittle religious belief,
such as when public school teachers are prohibited from reading Bibles
in their classrooms or when military personnel are not allowed to wear
yarmulkes.
Carter's initial description of religion's trivialization in the public
sphere demonstrates both the strengths and weaknesses of an anecdotal
argument. The stories are calculated to lead the reader (at least the
religious reader) to conclude that something in our society is indeed
amiss. However, the anecdotal nature of his evidence for the
trivialization of religion leaves Carter vulnerable to counter-anecdotes
about religion's pervasive influence in public life, in, for example, the
language of our political campaigns and the speeches of our presidents.
Not only Republican Presidents Bush and Reagan, but also Democratic
Presidents Carter and Clinton openly relied upon religious language and
symbolism during their tenure. One commentator on American religion
has even attributed Dukakis' loss to Bush in part to his failure to
understand or capture the religious spirit of the American people."
Carter confronts this argument that religion is pervasive, but ultimately
dismisses it by concluding that much of our public religious discourse is
itself trivial. Carter's second type of trivialization, then, concerns the
way in which our society's use of religious language and imagery
trivializes religion by treating "God as a hobby." 5 Politicians frequently
1. STEPHEN L. CARTER, THE CULTURE OF DISBELIEF: How AMERICAN LAW
AND POLITICS TRIVIALIZE RELIGIOUS DEVOTION 6 (1993).
2. Id. at 141.
3. Id. at 15.
4. See GARRY WILLS, UNDER GOD: RELIGION AND AMERICAN POLITICS 51-61
(1990).
5. , CARTER, supra note 1, at 23-43.
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refer to God, but their language is not religiously serious. Carter accepts
that religious rhetoric is ubiquitous. However, he concludes that
the seeming ubiquity of religious language in our public debates
can itself be a form of trivialization-both because our
politicians are expected to repeat largely meaningless religious
incantations and because of the modern tendency among
committed advocates across the political spectrum to treat Holy
Scripture like a dictionary of familiar quotations, combing
through the pages to find the ammunition needed to win political
arguments.'
Such trivialization occurs, for instance, when politicians state that God
supports their point of view, or when they assert that God brings the
nation to victory in war. While Carter sees such rhetoric as harmful to
our society, he also has serious religious reasons for opposing it: he
"tremble[s] for [the] souls" of persons who so abuse religion.7
A third danger also confronts religion in the public arena: when the
state has too much power over religion, religious belief is trivialized.
One of Carter's themes throughout the book is that religion must remain
independent of the state; otherwise, it loses the prophetic voice that allows
it to criticize secular power. Carter often cites David Tracy for the point
that the purpose of religion is to embody the power of resistance.8
Religious witness is discredited when religion becomes the servant of
politics. Trivialization occurs when the state becomes the final arbiter of
religious matters, when the state oversteps its bounds and seeks to control
religion. Thus trivialization may occur, not only in social and political
settings, but when society's institutions, especially the courts, attempt to
control religious practice. "To insist that the state's secular moral
judgments should guide the practices of all religions is to trivialize the
idea that faith matters to people." 9
This state control of religious institutions is Carter's central concern;
he devotes the second part of the book to an analysis of how this
country's legal institutions have contributed to the trivialization of
religion. However, there is a final type of trivialization identified in the
early chapters of the book. This fourth type of trivialization is not the
result of journalists', politicians', judges' or other citizens' acts against
religion. Instead, at times, "it is the religiously faithful who are the
6. Id. at 45.
7. Id. at 47.
8. Id. at 37, 41, 82, 142.
9. Id. at 38.
1994:1287 1289
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trivializers, in the relentless effort to demonstrate that the Word of God
supports virtually every political cause."" °  In Carter's view,
trivialization occurs when believers look to political ideals as the source
of their convictions, and then interpret the Word of God in light of these
political commitments. Carter opposes this procedure; true believers
begin with the Word of God, and then apply it. Their starting point must
never be political conviction. The faithful trivialize religion when they
use it as a prop for predetermined political positions. "If the role of the
religionist is first to make up his or her mind about which political
position to take and next to search for religious arguments to support the
already selected view, the idea of faith as the source of moral inspiration
is trivialized.""
The trivialization thesis, then, incorporates a broad array of concerns
about religion. Carter's description of the anti-religious tenor of our
society's rhetoric is in many ways accurate. One irony surrounding this
book is that the reaction to its publication confirms some aspects of its
trivialization thesis. Religious leaders and religious scholars have for
years identified troubling attitudes toward religion in American public
life. They have long decried a growing secularization that refuses to take
religion seriously, and have offered numerous suggestions to infuse
religion into the public square. 2 However, that thesis now appears to
have gained credibility because it is enunciated by a Yale law professor;
the book has received sustained attention in the media, as well as
favorable publicity from another lawyer, the President of the United
States. Perhaps religion appears less trivial when defended by graduates
and faculty of the well-respected Yale Law School, but is suspect when
a minister or theologian defends it.
Nonetheless, Carter has done a great service in provoking debate on
this subject. While his anecdotes do not prove his case, they will resonate
with the experience of many citizens. It is not surprising that a lawyer
wrote this book, for any "religious" person who has, inhabited the
courtrooms, law firms, or law schools of this country will appreciate the
force of Carter's portrayal. His anecdotes capture an attitude that is
indeed present in this society's legal and political institutions.
10. Id. at 68.
11. Id. at 81.
12. See, e.g., MICHAEL J. HIMES, FULLNESS OF FAITH: THE PUBLIC
SIGNIFICANCE OF THEOLOGY (1993); MARTIN E. MARTY, THE PUBLIC CHURCH:
MAINLINE, EVANGELICAL, CATHOLIC (1981); RICHARD P. MCBRIEN, CAESAR'S COIN:
RELIGION AND POLITICS IN AMERICA (1987); CHRISTOPHER F. MOONEY, PUBLIC VIRTUE:
LAW AND THE SOCIAL CHARACTER OF RELIGION (1986); RICHARD J. NEUHAUS, THE
NAKED PUBLIC SQUARE: RELIGION AND DEMOCRACY IN AMERICA (1984).
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However, Carter's treatment of religion is often inadequate,
especially in the description of the third and fourth types of trivialization.
As I have mentioned, Carter does not restrict his criticisms to the
"unreligious": he criticizes religious believers for their trivialization of
religion. He fears that religious believers trivialize religion when they
become "political preachers." He worries that religion is trivialized when
churches ally themselves too closely with the state. In each instance,
Carter's analysis does not adequately address the complexity of the
problems confronting the "serious" religious believer. This limitation
runs the risk of trivializing religious discourse.
Carter devotes chapter four to this problem of "political preaching."
Under the label of political preaching, Carter criticizes religious adherents
who first decide their political convictions, and then express those
convictions in religious language. He again uses anecdotes to make his
point: he relates the stories of a Catholic priest who preaches against the
ACLU and a divinity school student who preaches against American
involvement in Central America. Carter worries that such preachers have
"no conception of a faith not guided by [their] prior political
commitments," and fears that the "political tail [is] wagging the scriptural
dog," that "politics [is] masquerading as religion." 3 Preachers of all
ideologies, both right and left, are guilty of this sin; they are "sincere,"
but their sincerity does not excuse their conduct. Carter identifies the
danger in this practice: the churches will reflect the values of their society
instead of preaching the prophetic word of God. Instead, churches that
heed the Word of God should make their members uncomfortable by
challenging society's values.
Carter's solution to the problem of political preaching appears to be
that believers should pay more attention to their foundational texts:
Ordinarily, a preacher concerned with the world can sensibly
turn his or her attention to the relevant holy book and find
guidance. Political preachers share this revealed guidance with
their flocks. Matters become troublesome, however, when
one's theology always ends up squaring precisely with one's
politics. At that point, there is reason to suspect that far from
trying to discern God's will and follow it in the world, the
political preacher is first deciding what path to take in the world
and then looking for evidence that God agrees. 4
13. CARTER, supra note 1, at 69.
14. Id. at 70.
1994:1287 1291
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Carter asks of religious believers that they discern, not create, the will of
God. Numerous times throughout the chapter, he asks believers to
consult the Word of God before they consult their political convictions.
"For there is a vital difference between a political inspiration that is fired
by one's deepest religious beliefs and a claim of religious belief that is
fired by a preexisting political commitment."15
This conception of the relationship between religious faith and
politics trivializes the complex faith of the believer. The weaknesses are
clear from the chapter's opening anecdotes. What is wrong with the
priest's and the student's sermons? On these facts, one cannot know
whether the preacher's starting point was the Word of God or her political
convictions. Moreover, it is not clear why one's political convictions
may never serve as the starting point of an action undertaken from
authentic faith. Carter's notion of political faith would exclude many
committed Christians from the definition of serious believer.
Carter assumes that the believer can turn to Scripture, and find in it
some neutral Word of God answering social and political questions.
However, as centuries of Christian ethical reflection attest, the believer's
moral life is not so simple. Scripture may not have the answer to a
specific political question. Its insights on certain issues may be
conflicting or contradictory. Different interpretations of Scripture may
yield different ethical norms. 6 Carter's description of simply turning
to the Word of God does convey the experience of many religious
believers in a variety of religious traditions. But this narrow
interpretation of sincere religious belief excludes the experiences of many
other believers who combine religious faith with political action in a
different manner. For many Christians, the world is a place of
revelation, where God communicates God's will to persons who seek to
understand it. For example, Carter refers numerous times to Roman
Catholic participation in politics, yet ignores the roots of that tradition in
natural law theory. The natural law tradition asserts that God's will is
inscribed in human nature, and is discerned by humans in the law of their
own being and in their interactions with others. Thus, it is precisely
through political events that one may learn something of God, and of
15. Id. at 80.
16. See generally BRUCE BIRCH & LARRY RASMUSSEN, BIBLE AND ETHICS IN
CHRISTIAN LIFE (1989); CHARLES A. CURRAN & RICHARD A. MCCORMICK, THE USE
OF SCRIPTURE IN MORAL THEOLOGY (1984); DAVID KELSEY, THE USES OF SCRIPTURE
IN RECENT THEOLOGY (1975); WILLIAM C. SPOHN, WHAT ARE THEY SAYING ABOUT
SCRIPTURE AND ETHICS? (1984); James F. Childress, Scripture and Christian Ethics:
Some Reflections on the Role of Scripture in Moral Deliberation and Justification, 34
INTERPRETATION 371 (1980); James M. Gustafson, The Place of Scripture in Christian
Ethics: A Methodological Study, 24 INTERPRETATION 430 (1970).
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God's will for human beings.17 Political preachers, then, may in fact be
extraordinarily attentive to the will of God.
Carter's treatment of the ordination of women in the Episcopalian
Church, his own religious tradition, illuminates his approach. Carter
should be commended for his ability to display his own religious
convictions as well as the tensions the believer may experience within his
own community of faith. Carter supports the ordination of women, yet
acknowledges the difficulties confronted by the church in the dispute over
women in the priesthood and episcopacy. He concludes that the
disagreement among Episcopalians
[i]s not a secular moral error and should not be described in
secular moral terms-it is an error in theological understanding
and should be described in theological terms. So if, as many
deeply pained opponents charge, the church was wrong, the
error was necessarily a misunderstanding of God's will; it
would not be proper for those of us who support the ordination
of women to say that the Bible cannot possibly wall off the
priesthood from women simply because we do not want it to,
for then we fall victim to the lure of political preaching.' 8
On this contested subject, then, "[t]he answer has everything to do with
discerning and then enacting the will of God, and nothing to do with the
rights of women."" 9 Carter states that his convictions about secular
equality are irrelevant to this question; it is what he believes as a
Christian that counts. For some believers, that is true. But for other
believers, the interaction between the world and the Word of God is far
more complex; Carter appears to accu se them of trivializing religion. As
Carter insists in later chapters, there are many misguided religious
believers who do horrible things in the name of religion. But the
"political preaching" decried by Carter is not necessarily a trivialization
of religion.
Carter acknowledges the abuses enacted in the name of religion, and
the dangers that arise from the exclusion of religion from public life.
However, he does not complete the next and necessary stage of the
argument: to emphasize that religion can and must learn from the moral
17. See generally THOMAS AQUINAS, SUMMA THEOLOGIAE 75 (Benzinger Bros.
1948) (question 94); CHARLES A. CURRAN & RICHARD A. MCCORMICK, NATURAL LAW
AND THEOLOGY (1991); GENE H. OUTKA & PAUL RAMSEY, NORM AND CONTEXT IN
CHRISTIAN ETHICS (1968); GENE H. OUTKA & JOHN P. REEDER, PROSPECTS FOR A
COMMON MORALITY (1993).
18. CARTER, supra note 1, at 77.
19. Id.
1994:1287 1293
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insights of the so-called secular world. For example, although Carter
does not discuss liberation theology in any detail, at one point he
dismisses liberation theologians for their politicization of the Word of
God.' Yet liberation theologians have identified the harm that comes
to society when churches pretend that they are apolitical and in doing so
support the unjust status quo. Moreover, it was a worldly insight-that
the poor were suffering tremendous injustice-that galvanized liberation
theologians to oppose poverty in the name of God.2" Many liberation
theologians display the complex interaction between religious conviction
and worldly action that Carter dismisses too rapidly as political
preaching.
In addition to attacking political preaching, Carter argues that
religion is trivialized when believers impose their political views on the
state through the development of interest groups and through growth in
political power. The result of this process, Carter fears, is religion's
corruption. Religion may lose the power of resistance if it gains actual
political power.
Again, religious treatment of this question is far more nuanced, and
Carter once more runs the risk of belittling legitimate theological
opinions. For example, the proper role of the Christian in politics has
been a central question throughout the history of Christianity, and is still
debated at length in contemporary Christian ethics. The "render unto
Caesar" text has not rendered a definitive answer. The merits and
demerits of the accession of the emperor Constantine to political power
are still assessed, as Christians ask whether it entailed a corruption of the
essential message of the Gospel, or was instead an appropriate
interpretation of the Gospel in new times and new places.22 That
discussion continues in the ongoing debate among Christians about the
merits of pacifism and just war theory.' Christians have also disagreed
about whether they should even participate in political life, a tension
evident in the history of Evangelicals in the United States, who for years
steered clear of politics but then turned to political activism out of
religious conviction.'
20. Id. at 81.
21. For the classic expression of these views, see GUSTAVO GUTIERREZ, A
THEOLOGY OF LIBERATION: HISTORY, POLITICS AND SALVATION (1971).
22. See, e.g., JOHN H. YODER, THE PRIESTLY KINGDOM: SOCIAL ETHICS AS
GOSPEL (1984).
23. See, e.g., DAVID HOLLENBACH, NUCLEAR ETHICS: A CHRISTIAN MORAL
ARGUMENT (1983).
24. See generally DAVID 0. MOBERG, THE GREAT REVERSAL: EVANGELISM AND
SOCIAL CONCERN (1977); TIMOTHY L. SMITH, REVIVALISM AND SOCIAL REFORM:
AMERICAN PROTESTANTISM ON THE EVE OF THE CIVIL WAR (1980).
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Within the tradition of Christianity, there are constant disputes about
the proper role of the Christian in politics. Carter does identify some of
the dangers of political life. Yet his warnings against religious corruption
would lead us to dismiss many believers who seek to combine religious
faith and political action. Throughout his book, Carter criticizes liberal
politicians and commentators for their anti-religious rhetoric, yet his
argument would exclude liberal theologians from the ranks of serious
believers.
This theological perspective also undermines Carter's analysis of the
history of the religion debate in the United States. Carter identifies the
liberal opposition to conservative criticism of Roe v. Wade' as a
turning point in this country's treatment of religion. However, Americans
have long disagreed about the role of religion in politics. Christians
disagreed about the civil rights movement, as Carter acknowledges.
Christian debate about nuclear arms has been vigorous, with positions
ranging from nuclear pacifism to acceptance of the first strike. Carter
tends to identify Catholics with the conservative side of abortion politics,
but their bishops' letter on nuclear weapons was greeted with considerable
dismay in conservative circles. The more accurate historical perspective
would instead suggest, not that Roe has changed the discussion, but that
citizens disagree about profound societal issues on both religious and
political grounds. One might add a commonsensical thesis: As a general
rule, individuals dislike the use of religion in political and legal argument
when they disagree with the political or legal viewpoint expressed. Thus,
conservatives oppose liberal religion, and liberals oppose conservative
religion. Such a thesis finds support in surveys that suggest that there is
more agreement between liberal Protestants and liberal Catholics, or
between Evangelical Protestants and conservative Catholics, than there is
across the spectrum of American Catholics or Protestants.'
This broader commonsensical thesis about American religion would
emphasize a question that Carter raises several times, but does not address
in sufficient detail: How should the religious believer participate in
American public life? Or to employ language consistent with the book:
What is the solution to the problem of trivialization? The reader can
glean some of Carter's views on this subject from his acceptance of fellow
law professor Michael Perry's writings on religion and law," but is left
25. 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
26. See, e.g., David Leage, The Decomposition of the Religious Vote, 1960-1992
(Sept. 1993) (unpublished paper presented at the annual convention of the American
Political Science Association).
27. CARTER, supra note 1, at 55-56 (citing MICHAEL J. PERRY, MORALITY,
POLITICS AND LAW 72-73 (1988); MICHAEL J. PERRY, LOVE AND POWER: THE ROLE OF
RELIGION AND MORALITY IN AMERICAN POLITICS (1991)).
1994:1287 1295
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wishing to learn more of Carter's specific views on this difficult subject.
Carter welcomes all religious voices into the American public square, and
encourages expression of political and legal convictions in explicitly
religious language.2" Along with Perry, he worries that religious
believers are asked to "bracket" their religious convictions when they
enter the public sphere." Such bracketing is unfair to religious believers
because it asks them to exclude an essential part of their identities from
the public square, an exclusion not demanded of non-religious citizens.
There are many possible solutions to this difficult problem of the role
of the religious believer in the public forum. For example, John Rawls,
in his recent book Political Liberalism,' argues that, for public matters,
citizens should convert their religious beliefs into arguments that meet the
criteria of public reason. While Carter does not address this particular
Rawlsian argument, he would certainly oppose this suggestion as an
inappropriate "bracketing" of religious belief, and would encourage
believers to express their religious beliefs publicly in explicitly theological
language. Carter believes that "all of these efforts to limit the
conversation to premises held in common would exclude religion from the
mix. " "
Carter is certainly correct that many political and legal arguments do
"exclude religion from the mix." For example, Ronald Dworkin's
heralded book Life's Dominion32 (published contemporaneously with
Carter's) addresses philosophical and religious arguments about abortion
and euthanasia, topics important to Carter. Dworkin focuses on
arguments about the "sacred," but his definition of sacred is at odds with
its use by adherents of religion. Indeed, Dworkin redefines key moral
arguments as religious in order to exclude them from the public square
on First Amendment grounds.
Carter seeks to prohibit just such limitations on the participation of
religious believers in public argument. However, if Dworkin allows too
little religious argument into the public square, Carter may allow too
much. There is some middle ground between Dworkin and Carter. If
trivialization is to be avoided, then Carter would do well to ask of
believers, not that they leap into the public arena proclaiming the will of
God, but that their arguments about religion be rigorous, just as legal and
political arguments must be rigorous.
28. Id.
29. Id. (quoting PERRY, MORALITY, POLITICS AND LAW, supra note 27, at 72-
73).
30. JOHN RAWLS, POLITICAL LIBERALISM (1993).
31. CARTER, supra note 1, at 55.
32. RONALD DWORKIN, LIFE'S DOMINION (1993).
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Carter may worry that a rigorous test of religious argument would
exclude too much religion from the public conversation. Michael Perry
has been accused of imposing such a rationalist requirement on religion
by excluding non-rationalist or fideist approaches to religious faith from
the public arena.3 3  Carter may strive to avoid that problem.
Nonetheless, there are good reasons to be rational about religion.
Religious traditions may at times contain moral insight that "secular"
reason ignores. For example, it is probable that the civil rights
movement was originally rooted in Martin Luther King's Christian faith,
and not in a reasonable interpretation of the Constitution. Yet religions
are also sources of division and discrimination, and at times defenders of
immoral conduct. For that reason, approaches to religion and politics that
encourage a mutual criticism-of religion by law and politics, and of
politics and law by religion-are more promising than Carter's uncritical
encouragement of theological argument.' For example, Rawls does not
ask religious believers to "bracket" their religious beliefs.35 In contrast
to Dworkin, he does not prefer philosophy to religion, but treats them
both as comprehensive views of equal status. His "wide" view of public
discourse is preferable to Carter's "open" view because it encourages
religious believers to be self-critical as well as critical of others. Carter's
open view may encourage, rather than discourage, trivialization.
The flaws in Carter's solution to the problem of trivialization carry
over into the legal chapters of the book. The Culture of Disbelief also
assesses the place of religion in the American legal system. Here Carter's
analysis is most thorough, lucid, and interesting, but also most
disappointing. He identifies the pressing issues in American jurisprudence
on religion, and discusses them with clarity and rigor. Yet here he
refrains from a normative conclusion when the reader is most eager for
the law professor's wisdom: with the exception of his Free Exercise
Clause analysis, he does not explain how the courts can avoid the
trivialization of religion.
Carter joins many scholars in criticizing the unsatisfactory condition
of the Supreme Court's First Amendment jurisprudence. He echoes a
theme popular among American scholars of religion-that the First
33. Sanford Levinson, Religious Language and the Public Square, 105 HARV. L.
REv. 2061, 2073-76 (1992) (book review).
34. See, e.g., Amy Gutmann & Dennis Thompson, Moral Conflict and Political
Consensus, 101 ETHICS 64, 70, 86-88 (1990) (placing some restraints on "radically
implausible" religious arguments, but encouraging a public philosophy that approaches
disagreements with collective moral discussion, even about divisive religious and moral
issues like abortion).
35. John Rawls, The Idea of Public Reason: Further Considerations (1993)
(unpublished manuscript, on file with author).
1994:1287 1297
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Amendment's purpose is to protect religion from the encroachments of the
state, and not to bar religion from the public square.'
Carter first identifies the weaknesses of Supreme Court Establishment
Clause cases. The jurisprudence is centered on the Lemon v. Kurtzman 7
test, a test that Carter calls a "lemon." To pass the Lemon test, "the
statute in question must meet three criteria: 'First, the statute must have
a secular legislative purpose; second, its principal or primary effect must
be one that neither advances nor inhibits religion; finally, the statute must
not foster 'an excessive entanglement with religion.""3" Carter is
critical of Lemon, but he does not explicitly propose an alternative
standard. He does argue that the religious motivation of the legislator
should not be significant for Establishment Clause analysis.39 He faults
the Court for at times taking religious motivation into consideration in its
constitutional analysis.' The Court did so, for example, in Edwards v.
Aguillard,41 when it struck down a law that required schools to teach
creationism. Carter agrees with the result of Edwards, but not with the
Court's reasoning that the statute was unconstitutional because its
supporters were religiously motivated2
In fact, Carter does not explicitly adopt any of the tests proposed by
scholars of Establishment Clause jurisprudence. 3 However, one can
infer that he favors a coercion test, which would prohibit governmental
action that coerces citizens into religious conduct. Carter supports the
Court's school prayer decisions" and its invalidation of the creationism
statute,45 and opposes public funding of creches." He supports statutes
that permit moments of silence in schools, presumably because they are
not coercive. Carter draws the line at the prohibition of Bible reading or
36. See generally CHRISTOPHER F. MOONEY, PUBLIC VIRTUE: LAW AND THE
SOCIAL CHARACTER OF RELIGION (1986); JOHN C. MURRAY, WE HOLD THESE TRUTHS:
CATHOLIC REFLECTIONS ON THE AMERICAN PROPOSITION (1960).
37. 403 U.S. 602 (1971).
38. CARTER, supra note 1, at 110 (quoting Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602).
39. Id. at 112.
40. Id. at 191.
41. 482 U.S. 578 (1987).
42. CARTER, supra note 1, at 111.
43. See, e.g., Lynch v. Donnelly, 465 U.S. 668, 689 (1984) (O'Connor, J.,
concurring) (proposing an endorsement test); Michael W. McConnell, Coercion: The Lost
Element of Establishment, 27 WM. & MARY L. REV. 933 (1986) (proposing a coercion
test); Michael W. McConnell, Religious Freedom at a Crossroads, 59 U. CHI. L. REV.
115, 175 (1992) (proposing a pluralist approach); Kathleen M. Sullivan, Religion and
Liberal Democracy, 59 U. CHI. L. REV. 195, 222 (1992) (contending First Amendment
establishes a civil public order).
44. CARTER, supra note 1, at 108, 186.
45. id. at 168-69.
46. Id. at 94-95.
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display by teachers, on their own time, in public school classrooms.47
Such conduct, he insists, does not violate the Establishment Clause.
Carter poses a test case designed to examine the role of religion in
the welfare state under current Establishment Clause jurisprudence. The
example involves a drug clinic director who is very effective in solving
drug addiction, but who asks his clients to pray as part of their treatment.
The drug clinic asks for government funding. Carter thinks that such
funding would be unconstitutional under Lemon. Carter's own resolution
of the problem is not clear. In another section of the book, he concludes
that on the Establishment Clause he casts his lot with Harold Berman and
so "would proscribe [state] establishments but would allow support on the
same basis as other groups."" Both Carter and the Supreme Court
leave us without clear alternatives to Lemon: despite predictions of its
demise, Lemon remains the law of the Establishment Clause.49
Carter offers important criticisms of Establishment Clause
jurisprudence. He concludes that the interpretation of the Establishment
Clause should
avoid the ahistorical conclusion that its principal purpose is to
protect the secular from the religious, an approach that, perhaps
inevitably, carries us down the road toward a new
establishment, the establishment of religion as a hobby, trivial
and unimportant for serious people, not to be mentioned in
serious discourse. 50
However, he does not make clear how a change in this jurisprudence
would solve, or at least ameliorate, the problem of trivialization. For
example, Carter is critical of the Supreme Court for not clearly abolishing
publicly funded creches under the Lemon test. It is never clear exactly
why this supporter of religion opposes the creches so vigorously, although
presumably it is due to an acceptance of the coercion standard. In this
area, constitutional law professor Michael McConnell seems to get the
better of the trivialization argument. In response to Court decisions that
allow a nativity scene "surrounded by a Santa Claus house, reindeer,
candy-striped poles, a Christmas tree, carolers, cut-out figures
representing such characters as a clown, an elephant, and a teddy bear,
47. See Roberts v. Madigan, 921 F.2d 1047 (10th Cir. 1990), cert. denied, 112
S. Ct.,3025 (1992).
48. CARTER, supra note 1, at 120.
49. The Court did not take the opportunity to overrule Lemon in Board of
Education v. Grumet, 114 S. Ct. 2481 (1994), despite some speculation that it would do
SO.
50. CARTER, supra note 1, at 115.
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hundreds of colored lights, a banner stating 'Season's Greetings,' and a
talking wishing well," but prohibit a nativity "tastefully displayed with a
backdrop of greenery and poinsettias," 5 McConnell concludes:
The Court appears to have arrived at the worst of all
possible outcomes. It would be better to forbid the government
to have religious symbols at all than to require that they be
festooned with the trappings of modern American materialism.
After all, no one's religion depends on whether the government
displays the symbols of the Christian and Jewish holidays. But
if there are to be religious symbols, they should be treated with
respect. To allow them only under the conditions approved by
the Court makes everyone the loser.
The religious symbols cases are themselves the perfect
symbol of the Supreme Court's attitude toward religion. The
Court does not object to a little religion in our public life. But
the religion must be tamed, cheapened, and secularized-just as
religious schools and social welfare ministries must be
secularized if they are to participate in public programs that are
supposed to be open to all. Authentic religion must be shoved
to the margins of public life; even there, it may be forced to
submit to majoritarian regulation.52
McConnell's solution is to allow more public exposure to a variety of
religious symbols.53 This conclusion appears consistent with Carter's
trivialization thesis, but is not the one that Carter recommends.
Carter is even more critical of the Court's Free Exercise decisions.
He believes that a strong Free Exercise Clause is necessary, not only in
an era of trivialization of religion, but in the era of the welfare state.'
He joins the widespread criticism of the Court's decision in Employment
Division v. Smith,55 the Oregon peyote case. In Smith, the Court refused
to grant an exemption to a state anti-drug law to Native American
employees who wanted to use peyote in their religious rituals. In addition
to Smith, Carter criticizes the Lyng case, in which the government passed
a law to develop a road through sacred territory needed for worship.56
The Court ruled for the government, based on its concern that the
51. McConnell, Religious Freedom at a Crossroads, supra note 43, at 126-27
(citations omitted).
52. Id. at 127.
53. Id. at 193.
54. CARTER, supra note 1, at 125-26.
55. 494 U.S. 872 (1990).
56. Lyng v. Northwest Indian Cemetery Protective Ass'n, 485 U.S. 439 (1988).
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government would not be able to act if it were always paying attention to
the religious needs of individuals.57
In both cases, the Court ignored the needs of the religious believer,
and so, Carter argues, defeated the purpose of the First Amendment.
Many laws of general application have an impact on religious believers.
Carter proposes a return to the compelling state interest test for these
cases. "[Tihe rule would be that the state, in trying to enforce a law
impinging on the religion's ability to sustain itself, would be required to
demonstrate a compelling interest in enforcement of the questioned
statute.""8 The state would therefore have to show a compelling goal
which it could not accomplish by less intrusive means. Exemptions for
religious believers are especially important in this era of the welfare state,
and Carter suggests that this compelling state interest test may be applied
to grant exemptions for religious practices that run afoul of federal
housing or discrimination law. Here he raises but does not resolve the
case of a religious landlord who runs afoul of state anti-discrimination law
when he declines to rent his apartment to a non-married couple because
of his religious opposition to fornication.59
In the Free Exercise area, Carter's argument about trivialization is
clearest. Religion will be trivialized if government, especially the
government of the welfare state, passes laws that erode the right of
individuals to religious freedom. Carter is correct to emphasize that the
minority religions are most endangered by the Court's reluctance to grant
exemptions in its First Amendment jurisprudence.' And here, at least,
one political institution agrees with Carter; the Congress recently passed
the Religious Freedom Restoration Act. 1 The Act seeks to re-establish
the pre-Smith standard of Sherbert v. Verner,62 which dictates that the
government may substantially burden religion only if it furthers a
compelling interest and employs the least restrictive means.
In the final sections of the book, Carter mentions other areas of the
law for which religion is important, namely euthanasia, abortion and
capital punishment. Once again, while it is clear that religion has much
to add to the public discussion of these issues, one looks in vain for
suggestions about how the courts can resolve these issues in a way that
does not trivialize religion. At times it is difficult to understand how
these chapters connect to the earlier sections of the book.
57. Id. at 452.
58. CARTER, supra note 1, at 132.
59. Id. at 136-45.
60. Id. at 126-29, 131-32.
61. The Religious Freedom Restoration Act of 1993, Pub. L. No. 103-141, 107
Stat. 1488 (1993).
62. 374 U.S. 398 (1963).
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It is too much to demand of Professor Carter that he resolve, in one
book, all the most complicated questions of our political and legal
systems. It is noteworthy that the book, while not providing systemic
resolutions to these difficult problems, offers a glimpse of one resolution
of the complex interaction between religion and the law. That resolution
is in the person of Professor Carter himself, who, in the midst of
academic discussions of disputed points, reveals his own attempts to
integrate his professional and religious life. In his discussions of his
professional experience, his participation in the Episcopal Church, and
most poignantly in the concerns he expresses about the education of his
children, Professor Carter exemplifies the concerns of a serious religious
believer who interacts with this society's legal and political institutions.
It is the display of such wisdom in his own reflections on law, politics
and religion that should leave readers anxious to hear in more detail the
systemic solutions that Professor Carter advocates for the problem of
trivialization.
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